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USE OF POST-ARREST, PRE-WARNING SILENCE IS PERMISSIBLE TO
IMPEACH DEFENDANT'S EXCULPATORY TRIAL TESTIMONY
F/etcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982)
In Fletcher v. Weir' the United States Supreme Court limited the
procedural protection afforded a criminal defendant, 2 holding that
when no Miranda warnings3 are given, the admission of a defendant's
post-arrest silence to impeach 4 his exculpatory trial testimony5 does not
violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.6
The defendant fatally stabbed his adversary during a fight and was
arrested seventeen hours later.7 Although the record provided no clear
indication whether the arresting officer informed the defendant of his
right to remain silent, as required by Miranda v. Arizona,8 the record
1. 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 80-85.
3. See infra note 8 and accompanying text.
4, Courts generally prohibit the state's use of post-arrest silence to prove the merits of the
case, See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
5. The question is particularly important where prosecutors must rebut the defendant's alibi
defense. When the defendant advances an alibi for the first time at trial, rebuttal is often difficult.
As a result, many jurisdictions require defendants to notify the prosecutor of any alibi prior to
trial. See, e.g., FED. R. CRiM. P. 12.1; IND. CODE ANN. tit. 35 § 36-4-1 (Bums 1982); KAN. CODE
OF CRIM. PROC. § 22.3218; MICH. CoMp. LAWS §§ 768.20, 768.21 (1970); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 174.087 (1969); N.Y. CRM. PROC. LAW § 250.20 (McKinney 1971); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 585
(1969); Wis. STAT. ArNN. § 971.23(8) (West 1974); ARiz. R. CiRAM. P. 15.2(B); COLO. R. CRIM. P.
12.1; D.C. COURT RULES-CRIMINAL DIVIsioN 61-1; FLA. R. CRAm. P. 3.200; ME. R. CRIM. P.
16(B); MINN. R. CRAM. P. 9.02 subd. l(3)(a); Mo. R. CRim. P. 25.34(A)(5); MONT. CODE CRIM. P.
95-1803(d); N.M.R. C ms. P. 32; N.D.R. Catm. P. 12.1; Omo 1L CRIM. P. 12.1; PA. R. CRAM. P.
312; VT. R. CRam. P. 12.1; WASH. SUPER. CT. CaRm. R. 4.7(B)(2)(ii).
In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1969), the Supreme Court rejected fifth amendment due
process and self-incrimination challenges to the Florida notice-of-alibi law. The decision laid to
rest constitutional concerns about this type of statute. See generally Epstein, Advance Notice of
Alibi, 55 J. CRIM L.C. & P.S. 29 (1964); Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery,
39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 228 (1964); Note, The Right of the Prosecutor to Advance Notice of the Defend-
ant's Alibi Defense, 2 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 417 (1975); Note, Criminal Discovery: California's
Treatment ofPretrialNotice ofAlibi, 7 Sw. U.L. REV. 338 (1975); Note, ConstitutionalImplications
of Notice-of-Alibi Provisions. 21 WAYNE L. REV. 1415 (1975).
6. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment states in pertinent part:
"[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law ... " Id
7. Weir v. Fletcher, 658 F.2d 1126, 1127 (6th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per
curiam).
8. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda requires that police warn arrestees of their right to remain
silent before interrogation. Id at 444. Courts define "interrogation" for Miranda purposes as
direct questioning or the functional equivalent. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298-302
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clearly showed that the defendant did remain silent after his arrest.9 At
his trial for intentional murder, the defendant took the stand volunta-
rily. On direct examination, he advanced for the first time an exculpa-
tory version of the incident.10 During cross-examination, the
prosecutor questioned the defendant about his failure to present the
exculpatory explanation before or after his arrest. 1
The trial court found the defendant guilty of manslaughter 2 and the
Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed. 3 The federal district court for the
Western District of Kentucky subsequently granted a writ of habeas
corpus 4 and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 5 On certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court reversed and held: Absent Miranda warnings,
prosecutorial use of post-arrest silence as prior inconsistent conduct to
impeach a defendant's testimony does not violate due process because
no state action has assured a defendant that his silence will not be used
against him.'
6
(1980). See also Grane, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need to Reconsider the Constitutional Premises
Underlying the Law of Confessions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1 (1979); Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams,
Massiah, and Miranda: What is Interrogation? When Does it Matter?, 67 GEo. L.J. 1 (1978);
Comment, Doyle v. Ohio: Use of a Defendant's Silencefor Impeachment at Trial, 8 Loy. U. CHI.
LJ. 438 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Use of Defendant's Silence].
9. 455 U.S. at 603-04.
10. Id The defendant testified that he accidentally stabbed the victim and that he acted in
self-defense.
11. Id Evidence ofpre-arrest silence is admissible for impeachment purposes. See infra note
34. During cross-examination of the defendant the following exchange took place concerning his
post-arrest silence:
Q. Why didn't you tell [the State Police] at the time that he accidentally fell down on
your knife?
A. Well, I didn't-
Mr. Osborne [Defense Attorney]: Judge, again, I am going to object. He had no reason
to tell them anything at the time.
By Mr. Bryant [Prosecuting Attorney]:
Q. Go ahead and tell us.
A. I didn't feel I ought to tell them anything.
Q. Okay. That's after your knife disappeared and after you fled all over Ballard
county, Barlow and Wickliffe; and 17 hours later your were picked up. You don't want
to tell us about anything? Of course, you don't have to.
Mr. Osborne: Again, I'm going to object and move this court to discharge this Jury in
this case because of the conduct on cross-examination.
The Court: Overruled.
Weir v. Fletcher, 658 F.2d 1126, 1128-29 (6th Cir. 1981).
12. Weir v. Fletcher, No. 77-225 (McCracken Cir. Ct. Mar. 8, 1978).
13. Weir v. Fletcher, No. 78-SC-430-MR (Ky. Feb. 27, 1979).
14. Weir v. Fletcher, No. C79-0149-P (GJ) (W.D. Ky. Dec. 7, 1979).
15. Weir v. Fletcher, 658 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir. 1981), rep'd, 455 U.S. 603 (1982).
16. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982).
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At common law, a criminal defendant's silence in the face of accusa-
tions that a reasonable, innocent person would rebut was admissible
17
under the "tacit admission" exception to the hearsay rule18 as substan-
tive proof of the state's case and as evidence to impeach the defendant's
exculpatory testimony.19 Contemporary courts frequently displace the
common law rule, disallowing the use of a defendant's silence as sub-
stantive evidence. These courts offer one or more of three possible ra-
tionales. First, some courts employ the self-incrimination provision of
the fifth amendment to exclude silence. 0 Second, other courts disallow
17. Before any evidence is admitted, it must be both logically and legally relevant. Logical
relevance exists when evidence is material and has probative value. See FED. R. EVID. 401.
Under the doctrine of legal relevance, the trial judge may exclude logically relevant evidence
when its probative danger outweighs its probative value. See Federal Rule of Evidence 403,
which states that, "[a]Ithough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence."
See generally C. McCoRMicK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 184-85 (E. Cleary 2d
ed. 1972).
18. As Wigmore defines the "tacit admission rule," "[a] failure to assert a fact, when it would
have been natural to assert it amounts in effect to an assertion of the non-existence of the fact." 3
A. WioMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1042 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1973). See United States v. Moore, 552 F.2d
1068 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Coppola, 526 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1975); Fowle v. United
States, 410 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1969). See also C. McCORMICK, supra note 17, § 270. See gener-
all, Brody, Admission Impliedfrom Silence, Evasion, and Equivocation in Massachusetts Criminal
Cases, 42 B.U.L. REv. 46 (1962); Schiller, On the Jurisprudence of the Ft/?h Amendment Right to
Silence, 16 Am. CaiM. L. REV. 197 (1974); Comment, Use of Defendant's Silence, supra note 8, at
443.
Two limitations on the common law rule are particularly notable. First, recognizing that silence
is inherently ambiguous, the framers of the Federal Rules of Evidence defined "statement" as:
"(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an
assertion." FED. R. Evlm. 801(a) (emphasis added). See Note, Impeaching a Defendant's Testi-
mony by Proof ofPost-Arrest Silenc" Doyle v. Ohio, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 261, 270-71 (1976).
Second, Wigmore suggests that the tacit admission rule is seriously affected by Miranda: "Certain
situations in particular may furnish a positive motive for silence without regard to the truth or
falsity of the statement. Whether the fact that the party was at the time under arrest creates such a
situation has been the subject of opposing opinions .... 4 A. WGMORE, supra, § 1072(4)
(emphasis in original).
19. Until the late 19th century, courts considered participants in criminal trials incompetent
to testify. Thus, courts have only recently become concerned with the use of a defendant's silence
to impeach. See J. GEORGE, JR., CONSTITUIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
CASEs 233 (1973). For a list of the first state court decisions recognizing the defendant's right to
testify, see Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 577 n.6 (1960).
20. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 441 (1974) (discussion of Miranda); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (fifth amendment rationale for right to remain silent); Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609, 612 (1965) (prosecutor's comment to jury about defendant's failure to
testify at former trial impermissibly penalizes exercise of fifth amendment right to remain silent);
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the use of silence by presuming that it lacks probative value.21 Finally,
when state action either explicitly or implicitly assures the defendant
that his silence is not usable for any purpose at trial, some courts hold
that use of that silence against the defendant is fundamentally unfair
and violates due process.2
In 1926, in Raffel v. United States,23 the United States Supreme
Court limited the protection provided by the fifth amendment's self-
incrimination provision, holding that the provision only precludes the
state's use of a defendant's silence if the defendant chooses not to tes-
tify.' In Raffel, the defendant, accused of conspiring to violate the
National Prohibition Act, chose not to testify at his first trial but
presented an alibi defense at his second trial.2  The Supreme Court
held that by choosing to take the stand the defendant waived his right
to remain silent. Accordingly, he was subject to the same questions
under cross-examination as any other witness, 26 including questions
Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1, 6 (1961) (failure to testify at two former trials inadmissible to
impeach the defendant in cross-examination); Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 196-97
(1943) (prosecutor may not comment on defendant's silence after court erroneously told defendant
he could rely on immunity). See also C. McComicKc, supra note 17, § 270.
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: "[No person]
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.. .. " U.S. CONST.
amend. V. The Supreme Court first applied the fifth amendment to the states in Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964). For a discussion of the origins of the privilege against self-incrimination, see C.
McCoRMicK, supra note 17, § 114.
For criticism of the expansion of the fifth amendment, see L. MAYERs, SHALL WE AMEND THE
FnFTH AMENDMENT? (1959); Cross, The Right of Silence and the Presumption of Innocence-Sacred
Cows or Safeguards afLiberty?, 11 J. Soc'Y PUB. TC HRS. L. 55 (1966-71); Givens, Reconciling the
FifthAmendment with the Needfor More Effective Law Enforcement, 52 A.B.A.J. 443 (1966); Hoff-
man, he Distortion of the Fph Amendmnent, 43 N.Y. ST. B.J. 330 (1971); Inban, Should WeAbol-
ish the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 2 CrIM. L. REv. 28 (1955).
On the other hand, some commentators argue that courts too severely restrict the fifth amend-
ment. See, eg., Berger, he Unprivileged Status of the Ffth Amendment: Fox Hunters, Old Wo-
men, Hermits, and the Burger Court, 54 NoTRE DAME LAW. 26 (1978).
21. See supra note 17 & infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
23. 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
24. Id. at 497. See supra note 20.
25. Id. at 495 (1926). At the first trial a government agent testified that the defendant had
made an incriminating statement before trial. The district court ordered retrial after the first jury
deadlocked. At the second trial the defendant testified. On cross-examination the prosecutor
questioned him about the reason for his prior silence. The Supreme Court upheld the prosecutor's
right to ask such questions.
26. Id. at 499. During cross-examination, the defendant must answer all questions relevant
to the scope of his testimony during direct examination. See FED. R. EviD. 611 (b); C. McCOR-
MCcK, supra note 17, § 21.
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about his former silence.27
Forty years later, in Miranda v. Arizona,2 8 the Supreme Court held
that the self-incrimination provision of the fifth amendment requires
police officers to advise suspects of their constitutional rights to remain
silent and obtain representation of counsel prior to custodial interroga-
tion.29  Failure to provide these warnings renders any subsequent ex-
culpatory or inculpatory statement by the defendant while in custody
inadmissible as substantive evidence.3" Such statements, however, are
admissible to impeach a defendant's inconsistent trial testimony.3'
27. Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 499 (1926). The Court held that the defendant's
silence was admissible both to impeach and to convict. Courts no longer permit the latter use. See
infra note 32 and accompanying text.
State courts questioned the continuing authority of Raffel in light of subsequent Supreme Court
decisions. See, e.g., Raithel v. State, 40 Md. App. 107, 117, 388 A.2d 161, 167 (1978); State v.
Carmody, 253 N.W.2d 415, 417 (N.D. 1977). See also infra notes 28-44 and accompanying text.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Raffel more than fifty years later, in Jenkins v. An-
derson, 447 U.S. 231, 236-37 (1980). The Jenkins Court argued that no case following Raffel had
undercut its reasoning. Id. at 237 n.4. Justice Stevens argued in a concurring opinion that post-
Raffel cases have eroded its significance in federal courts. Id. at 241-42 (1980) (Stevens, J., con-
curring). For further discussion of Jenkins, see infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. See also
Doyle v. United States, 426 U.S. 610, 623 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Commentators have criticized the Supreme Court's revival of Raffel. See, e.g., Note, Impeach-
ment Use of Prearrest Silence Violates Neither Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment
Nor Due Process Component of the Fourteenth Amendment: Jenkins v. Anderson, 54 TEMP. L.Q.
331, 349 (1981); Comment, Jenkins v. Anderson: The Ffth Amendment Fails to Protect Prearrest
Silence. 59 DEN. L.J. 145, 154 (1981); Comment, Impeachment Use of Prearrest Silence Violates
Neither the Privilege Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination Nor the Fundamental Fairness Guaran-
tee ofthe Due Process Clause, 58 U. DET. J. URB. L. 307, 315-16 (1981).
28. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
29. Id. at 444. Miranda provides a system for the practical enforcement of the right to re-
main silent, which the Court held is grounded in the self-incrimination provision of the fifth
amendment. Prior to Miranda, the Court used the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to provide some measure of protection against involuntary confessions that were the
product of unfair or unreasonable interrogations. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 441-43
(1974).
30. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
31. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statement made following arrest but before
Miranda warnings issued admissible to impeach defendant's inconsistent statement at trial). Har-
ris contradicted the unanimous position of the federal circuit courts. See id. at 229-31. After
Harris, twenty-one of the twenty-seven state supreme courts to consider the issue adopted the
Harris holding. See Campbell v. State, 341 So. 2d 742 (Ala. 1976); State v. Jorgenson, 108 Ariz.
476, 502 P.2d 158 (1972); Rooks v. State, 250 Ark. 561, 466 S.W.2d 478 (1971); Jorgensen v. Peo-
ple, 174 Colo. 144, 482 P.2d 962 (1971); Hill v. State, 316 A.2d 557 (Del. 1974); State v.
Retherford, 270 So. 2d 363 (Fla.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973); McHan v. State, 232 Ga. 470,
207 S.E.2d 457 (1974); People v. Byers, 50 Ill. 2d 210, 278 N.E.2d 65 (1972); Davis v. State, 256
Ind. 58, 271 N.E.2d 893 (1971); State v. Greene, 214 Kan. 78, 519 P.2d 651 (1974); State v. Marin,
352 A.2d 746 (Me. 1976); Commonwealth v. Harris, 364 Mass. 236, 303 N.E.2d 115 (1973); People
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Moreover, if the defendant chooses to remain silent, either before or
after arrest, the state may not subsequently use this silence as substan-
tive proof of guilt.3 2
The propriety of using the defendant's silence solely for impeach-
ment purposes, on the other hand, poses a more difficult problem.33
After Miranda, lower courts disagreed about whether to allow the use
of post-arrest silence34 to impeach a defendant's testimony." The
v. Brown, 399 Mich. 350, 249 N.W.2d 693 (1976); Booker v. State, 325 So. 2d 791 (Miss. 1976);
State v. Bazis, 190 Neb. 586, 210 N.W.2d 919 (1973); Johnson v. State, 92 Nev. 405, 551 P.2d 241
(1976); State v. Bryant, 280 N.C. 551, 187 S.E.2d 111 (1972); State v. Kassow, 28 Ohio St. 2d 141,
227 N.E.2d 435 (1971); Langdell v. State, 556 P.2d 1076 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976); Riddell v. Rhay,
79 Wash. 2d 248, 484 P.2d 907 (1971); Ameen v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 175, 186 N.W.2d 206 (1971).
See generally Gruhl, State Supreme Courts and the United States Supreme Court's Post-Miranda
Rulings, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 886, 894-96 (1981) (discussion of post-Harris state cases).
32. Even prior to Miranda, many courts disallowed the state's use of silence to prove its case.
See generally 4 W. WIGMORE, supra note 18, § 1072.
Since Miranda, federal courts have uniformly held that silence is inadmissible to prove the
defendant's guilt. See, e.g., United States v. Ghiz, 491 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Faulkenberry, 472 F.2d 879 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 970 (1973); United States v. Kroslack,
426 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1970); United States ex rel Smith v. Brierly, 384 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1967);
United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1967); United States v. Mullings, 364 F.2d 173
(2d Cir. 1966).
33. Miranda contained broad dictum: "The prosecutor may not ... use at trial the fact that
[the defendant] stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation." Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966). Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), substantially
narrowed the Miranda dictum, but did not address post-arrest silence.
In People v. Conyers, 49 N.Y.2d 174, 178, 400 N.E.2d 342, 347, 424 N.Y.S.2d 402, 407 (1980),
vacated and remanded, 101 S. Ct. 56 (1981), in which the defendant was impeached by his post-
arrest silence, the New York Court of Appeals explained that "It]he State's interest in preventing
perjury is a great one, and the use of a defendant's silence for impeachment purposes imposes less
of a toll upon the exercise of the privilege than does the use of that silence as proof of guilt."
Nevertheless, the Conyers court disallowed the use of the defendant's silence. For a discussion of
Conyers, see infra notes 55 & 57-59 and accompanying text.
34. Pre-arrest silence is now admissible for impeachment purposes. See Jenkins v. United
States, 447 U.S. 231, 234 (1980) (evidence that defendant waited two weeks before reporting stab-
bing to the police or surrendering admissible to impeach defendant's claim of self-defense). For a
discussion of Jenkins, see infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
35. The District of Columbia, Second, Sixth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits held that post-arrest
silence was inadmissible to impeach the defendant's testimony. See United States v. Anderson,
498 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1974), Deats v. Rodriguez; 477 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1973); Johnson v.
Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973); United States v. Semen-
sohn, 421 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Nolan, 416 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1969); Gillison
v. United States, 399 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259 (6th Cir.
1967).
The Third and Fifth Circuits, on the other hand, upheld the admissibility of post-arrest silence
for impeachment purposes. See United States ex re. Burt v. New Jersey, 475 F.2d 234 (3d Cir.),
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Supreme Court resolved this dispute in United States v. Hale36 when it
created a rebuttable presumption against the use of post-arrest silence
for impeachment. The Court held that silence following the adminis-
tration of Miranda warnings is characteristically ambiguous.37  Thus,
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 938 (1973); United States v. Ramirez, 441 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 869 (1971).
Even before Miranda, some circuit courts refused to allow use of defendant's post-arrest silence
to impeach his trial testimony. See, e.g., Ivey v. United States, 344 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1965);
Fagundes v. United States, 340 F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1965).
For a general history of the use of post-arrest silence in the federal courts, see Note, supra note
18, at 261; Comment, Accused's Silence During Custodial Interrogation May Not Be Used to Im-
peach Credibility, 30 U. MIAMi L. REv. 773, 774-75 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Ac-
cused's Silence]; Comment, Impeaching a Defendant's Trial Testimony by Proof of Post-Arrest
Silence, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 940, 945 (1975); Comment, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, the
Use During Trial of a Defendant's Silence at the Time of Arrest, 10 WASHBURN L.J. 105, 105-12
(1970).
Ten of fifteen state supreme courts to consider the question between 1966 and 1975 prohibited
the use of the defendant's post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes. See, e.g., People v. Bur-
ress, 183 Colo. 146, 515 P.2d 460 (1973); State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 486 P.2d 260 (1971);
Cessna v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d 283 (Ky. 1971); People v. Bobo, 390 Mich. 355, 212
N.W.2d 190 (1973); Miles v. State, 525 P.2d 1249 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974); Commonwealth v.
Woods, 455 Pa. 1, 312 A.2d 357 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880 (1974); Reid v. Commonwealth,
213 Va. 790, 195 S.E.2d 866 (1973); State v. Dean, 67 Wis. 2d 513, 227 N.W.2d 712 (1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1074 (1976); Gabrielson v. State, 510 P.2d 534 (Wyo. 1973).
For state supreme court cases upholding the use of post-arrest silence for impeachment pur-
poses, see Davis v. State, 501 P.2d 1026 (Alaska, 1972); State v. Bly, 215 Kan. 168, 523 P.2d 397
(1974); People v. Rothschild, 35 N.Y.2d 355, 320 N.E.2d 639, 361 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1974); State v.
Young, 27 Ohio St. 2d 310, 272 N.E.2d 353 (1971). See generally Gruhl, supra note 31, at 896-97
(discussing state cases addressing impeachment use of post-arrest silence).
36. 422 U.S. 171 (1975). For a discussion of Hale, see Note, supra note 18, at 261-78; Com-
ment, Impeachment of a Criminal Defendant by Evidence of Post-Arrest Silence: A Conflict Partially
Resolved, 61 IowA L. REv. 641 (1975); Comment, Use of a Defendant's Silence, supra note 8, at
445-52; Comment, Accused's Silence, supra note 35, at 773; 4 HOFSTRA L. REv. 115 (1975).
37. 422 U.S. at 177. Following a robbery, police approached the defendant who fled and was
subsequently captured. The police discovered cash in excess of the stolen amount in his posses-
sion. The police arrested the defendant for the robbery and informed him of his right to remain
silent. The robbery victim later identified the defendant, who gave no explanation for his flight or
possession of the money. During his trial testimony, the defendant asserted for the first time that
he had been on his way to purchase narcotics when he was arrested. Id See also Doyle v. Ohio,
426 US. 610, 617-18 (1976).
The Hale Court discussed several factors that could induce a suspect to remain silent after
arrest: (1) the suspect's exercise of his right to remain silent under Miranda; (2) his natural fear
and confusion following arrest; and (3) his fear of incriminating another. United States v. Hale,
422 U.S. 171, 176-77 (1975). See also People v. Conyers, 5 N.Y.2d 454, 420 N.E.2d 933, 458
N.Y.S.2d 741 (1981) (silence may result from defendant's natural distrust of police and belief that
alibi would do no good). See generally Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection,
Detention, and Trial, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 657 (1966); Note, Tacit CriminalAdmissions, 112 U. PA.
L. REV. 210 (1963).
In determining the probative value of silence, the Supreme Court in Hale applied the same test
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the Court concluded that trial courts should exclude evidence of post-
arrest silence because the probative danger of using such evidence 38 for
trial impeachment outweighs its probative value in the truth-seeking 39
process. 4° Because the Supreme Court decided Hale on evidentiary
rather than constitutional grounds,4' however, the decision did not
bind state courts.42
it had used in the landmark evidence case of Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 422-23
(1957). This test employs three factors to determine if silence is inconsistent with subsequent
testimony:
1. repeated assertions of innocence before the grand jury;
2. the secretive nature of the tribunal in which the initial questioning occurred; and,
3. the focus on petitioner as potential defendant at the time of the arrest, making it
natural for him to fear that he was being asked for the very purpose of providing evi-
dence against himself.
United States v. Hale, 442 U.S. 171, 178 (1975).
Hale created a rebuttable evidentiary presumption against the use of post-arrest silence for
impeachment purposes at trial. If the defendant's silence had met the Grunewald test of probative-
ness, however, it would have been logically relevant. Because Hale did not establish an irrebut-
table presumption against the prosecutorial use of a defendant's post-arrest silence for
impeachment purposes, the Court was able to distinguish Raffel without overturning it.
38. The Court argued that cross-examination of defendants regarding post-arrest silence and
prosecutorial comment on that silence during closing arguments have an "intolerably prejudicial"
effect on the jury. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180 (1975). See generally Comment, 123
U. PA. L. REv. 940, supra note 35, at 973-74 (jury will construe post-arrest silence as evidence of
guilt).
39. The Court has often emphasized the importance of its truth-seeking function when decid-
ing on the admissibility of a defendant's silence. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238
(1980); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1976).
40. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 173, 180 (1975). When the probative danger out-
weighs the probative value of evidence in this manner, the evidence is deprived of legal relevance.
See supra note 17. For cases in which the Court has held that the need for the truth outweighs the
threat of danger to the defendant, see, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 721-22 (1975) (post-
warning statement made prior to presence of attorney usable to impeach defendant's inconsistent
trial testimony); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (statement obtained without Mi-
randa warnings usable to impeach defendant's trial testimony); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S.
62, 66 (1954) (fruits of illegal search usable to impeach defendant's trial testimony); Fitzpatrick v.
United States, 178 U.S. 304, 305 (1900) (to insure complete information, a defendant who testifies
is subject to cross-examination). See generally Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 628-30 (1976).
41. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 173 (1975).
42. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 605 (1982). See generally Cupp v. Naughton, 414
U.S. 141, 146 (1973) (states may disregard non-constitutionally based Supreme Court decisions);
McNabb v.United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1943) (Court has power to establish rules to gov-
ern federal courts which do not bind the states because they lack a constitutional basis).
Of the five state supreme courts to confront the issue between Hale and Doyle v. Ohio, only
Tennessee declined to adopt the Hale evidentiary presumption. See Niemeyer v. Commonwealth,
533 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1976); Vipperman v. State, 92 Nev. 213, 457 P.2d 682 (1976); State v.
Deatore, 70 N.J. 100, 358 A.2d 163 (1970); Braden v. State, 534 S.W.2d 657 (Tenn. 1976). See also
Gruhl, supra note 31, at 897-98 (discussion of post-Hale state cases).
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The following year, the Supreme Court extended the Hale rule to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in
Doyle v. Ohio . 3 The Court held that because the administration of
Miranda warnings implicitly assures a defendant that his subsequent
silence will carry no penalty and because such silence is "insoluably
ambiguous," the use of such silence for impeachment purposes violates
the fundamental fairness requirement of the due process clause."
Doyle, however, only partially resolved the controversy over the
state's use of a defendant's post-arrest silence to impeach his testimony
at trial.45 The decision identified both the arrest and the administration
43. 426 U.S. 610, 611, 619 (1976). The defendant in Doyle was arrested for selling marijuana.
He made no statement until his trial, at which time he testified that he had only attempted to buy
the marijuana. Id. at 613-14. For a discussion of Doyle, see Note, supra note 18, at 261; Com-
ment, Use of Defendant's Silence, supra note 8, at 443; Comment, Constitutional Prohibition Against
Use of Post-Arrest Silencefor Impeachment Purposes, 81 DICK. L. REV. 649 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Constitutional Prohibition]; Comment, Post-Arrest Silence: Usefor Impeachment Purposes
Prohibited, 22 Loy. L. REV. 1073 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Post-Arrest Silence].
The Doyle Court also made the Hale evidentiary presumption irrebuttable by banning the use
of post-arrest silence as "insoluably ambiguous." Id. at 617-18. See Note, supra note 18, at 261.
44. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618-19 (1976). The Court in Doyle stated that:
[W]hile it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence
will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings.
In such circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due pro-
cess to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subse-
quently offered at trial.
Id. at 618.
A similar issue arose in Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943). The prosecutor in John-
son commented on the defendant's silence during cross-examination. The Supreme Court re-
versed the defendant's conviction, noting that even though the trial judge erred in allowing the
defendant to remain silent, the defendant had relied on the judge's ruling. To allow the use of the
ensuing silence to impeach the defendant would violate due process. Id. at 196-97. The Johnson
Court also held that the authorities must inform the defendant if silence is admissible against him
so that he may make an informed decision whether to exercise his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Id. at 198-99. See also Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 425 (1959) (defendants relied on deci-
sion of chairman of state investigating committee that they could invoke the fifth amendment
privilege). See generally Constitutional Prohibition, supra note 43, at 651-52 (discussion of Doyle's
applicability to Johnson and Raley).
45. By basing its decision on the due process clause and evidentiary grounds, see supra notes
43-44, the Dole Court succeeded in avoiding the self-incrimination questions raised by the case.
Circuit courts that addressed the problem of post-arrest silence after Miranda, on the other hand,
frequently based their holdings on the fifth amendment's self-incrimination provision. See supra
note 35. These courts read broadly Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), in which the
Supreme Court held that the fifth amendment prohibits the state's use as evidence of a defendant's
exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination. They add to this broadening of Griffin the
dictum in Miranda which purports to prohibit the prosecutor's use at trial of a defendant's silence
or claimed privilege against self-incrimination. See supra note 33.
The circuit courts advanced two arguments in support of their refusal to permit the use of post-
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of Miranda warnings as silence-inducing state action.46 The Court did
not expressly answer the question whether arrest alone, absent Miranda
warnings, provides sufficient inducement of silence to prohibit its use
on due process grounds.
The Supreme Court indirectly addressed this issue in the dicta of two
post-Doyle cases.47 In Jenkins v. Anderson, 8 the Court sustained the
prosecutor's use of the defendant's pre-arrest silence for impeachment
purposes.4 9 Distinguishing Doyle, the Jenkins Court suggested that the
defendant's ability to prevent the impeachment use of his silence on
due process grounds depends on the state's administration of Miranda
warnings." In Roberts v. United States,5 the Court affirmed the use of
arrest silence. First, admitting evidence of silence penalizes the defendant's exercise of his fifth
amendment privilege. Second, jurors often cannot distinguish between evidence introduced for
impeachment purposes and evidence used to establish guilt. See Note, supra note 18, at 288-90.
Ten of the thirteen state supreme courts to evaluate the impeachment use of post-arrest silence
after 1976 followed Doyle without dissent. See Stork v. State, 559 P.2d 99 (Alaska 1977); State v.
White, 97 Idaho 708, 551 P.2d 1344 (1976); Jones v. State, 265 Ind. 447, 355 N.E.2d 402 (1976);
State v. Mims, 220 Kan. 726, 556 P.2d 387 (1976); State v. Smith, 336 So. 2d 867 (La. 1976); State
v. Lyle, 73 N.J. 403, 375 A.2d 629 (1977); State v. Foddrell, 291 N.C. 546, 231 S.E.2d 618 (1977);
State v. Carmody, 253 N.W.2d 413 (N.D. 1977); State v. Boyd, 233 N.E.2d 710 (W. Va. 1977);
Irvin v. State, 560 P.2d 372 (Wyo. 1977). Three state supreme courts distinguished Doyle. See
State v. Alo, 57 Hawaii 418, 558 P.2d 1012 (1976); State v. Osborne, 50 Ohio St. 2d 211, 364
N.E.2d 216 (1977); State v. Thompson, 88 Wash. 2d 518, 564 P.2d 315 (1977). See also Gruhl,
supra note 31, at 898 (discussion of post-Doyle state cases).
46. Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Doyle stated: "We hold that the use for im-
peachment purposes of petitioner's silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warn-
ings, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S.
610, 619 (1975).
While the use of the conjunctive form suggests that both arrest andMiranda warnings are neces-
sary to raise due process concerns, lower courts have not interpreted Doyle in this manner. See
infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
47. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980); Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552
(1980). Because neither case concerned post-arrest, pre-warning silence, they are useful only as
persuasive authority.
48. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
49. Id. at 234. The Court reasoned that first, because Raffel is still good law, impeachment
based on prior silence is permissible unless such silence was induced by governmental action
thereby making it inherently ambiguous or fundamentally unfair; second, the probative value of
pre-arrest silence is a state evidentiary question and therefore is not within the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction; and third, pre-arrest silence is not induced by any governmental action. Id. at 239-40.
Justice Marshall, in a strong dissent, argued that first, Raffel is bad law; second, the probativeness
of prearrest silence requires testing to determine if the silence is inconsistent with the defendant's
trial testimony; and third, the defendant's exercise of his fifth amendment right to remain silent is
impermissibly burdened by the prosecutorial use of silence. Id. at 246-54 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
50. The Court stated that "[in this case, no governmental action induced petitioner to remain
silent before arrest. The failure to speak occurred before the petitioner was taken into custody and
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a defendant's post-conviction silence for sentencing purposes52 and
again distinguished Doyle,53 suggesting that Miranda warnings were es-
sential to the due process rationale employed in Doyle.54
Two state courts, however, directly confronted the question of the
use of post-arrest, pre-warning silence and concluded that due process
demanded its exclusion. In People v. Conyers55 and Michigan v.
Hurd,56 appellate courts of New York and Michigan respectively, re-
versed the defendants' convictions because of prosecutorial references
during trial to post-arrest, pre-warning silence.57 The court in Conyers
based its decision on both self-incrimination and due process
grounds,58 while the iurd court relied on self-incrimination alone.59
Several circuit courts have also argued for the application of the
given Miranda warnings. Consequently, the fundamental unfairness of Doyle is not present in
this case." Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980). For an analysis of Jenkins, see Ayer,
The Fih Amendment and the Inference of Guilt from Silence: Griffin v. California After Ffteen
Years, 78 MICH. L. REv. 841 (1980); Jenkins v. Anderson: Self-Incrimination-Prearrest Silence,
66 A.B.AJ. 1288 (1980). See also supra note 27.
51. 445 U.S. 552 (1980).
52. Id. at 561.
53. Id. at 552. The Roberts Court stated that, "fh]is conduct bears no resemblance to the
insoluably ambiguous post-arrest silence that may be induced by the assurances contained in Mi-
randa warnings." Id. at 561.
54. Id. at 552. See also Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980). In Anderson, the Supreme
Court held that the prosecution may impeach a defendant's trial testimony with evidence of a
prior inconsistent statement. The Court distinguished Doyle in a way that suggested the necessity
of Miranda warnings to the Doyle defense:
Doyle bars the use against a criminal defendant of silence maintained after receipt of
governmental assurances. But Doyle does not apply to cross-examination that merely
inquires into prior inconsistent statements. Such questioning makes no unfair use of
silence, because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings
has not been induced to remain silent.
Id. at 408.
55. 49 N.Y.2d 174, 400 N.E.2d 342, 424 N.Y.S.2d 402, vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 809
(1980).
56. 102 Mich. App. 424, 301 N.W.2d 881 (1980), vacated and remanded, 454 U.S. 807 (1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982).
57. Id. at 429-30, 301 N.W.2d at 883-84; People v. Conyers, 49 N.Y.2d 174, 176-77, 400
N.E.2d 342, 344, 424 N.Y.S.2d 402, 404, vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 809 (1980).
58. 49 N.Y.2d at 179, 400 N.E.2d at 346, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 406, vacated and remanded, 449
U.S. 809 (1980). The New York Court of Appeals observed:
[Tihe implied promise, contained in the Miranda warnings, that one's silence will not be
used against one, is not derived from the words of the Miranda warnings, but from the
actual constitutional guarantees which they express. Thus, regardless of whether that
promise is repeated by the police in the form of Miranda warnings, each and every citi-
zen has already been made just such a promise by the State. . . . Having made that
promise, the State may not, consistent with any concept of fairness and due process,
subsequently renege on that promise by utilizing a defendant's silence against him.
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Doyle rule to cases involving the use of post-arrest, pre-warning silence
for trial impeachment.60 In Weir v. Fletcher,61 for example, the Sixth
Id.
The dissent vigorously disagreed, asserting that in the absence of Miranda warnings, the state
does not violate the defendant's right to due process by using silence to impeach his trial testimony
because there is "no 'state action' upon which to predicate a due process claim." Id. at 185, 400
N.E.2d at 350, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 410 (Meyer, J., dissenting). As for the self-incrimination issue, the
dissent argued for application of the Raffel standard, allowing evidence of the defendant's silence
if it is "inconsistent" with his trial testimony. Id. at 190, 400 N.E.2d at 352, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 413
(Meyer, J., dissenting).
59. Michigan v. Hurd, 102 Mich. App. 424, 430, 301 N.W.2d 881, 883 (1980), vacated and
remanded, 454 U.S. 807 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982). The Michigan Court of Appeals
stated that, "[i]f the [tacit admission] rule were applied in criminal cases [in Michigan], it would
violate the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination." Id.
The United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded both decisions for reconsideration in
light of Jenkins. Michigan v. Hurd, 454 U.S. 807 (1981); People v. Conyers, 449 U.S. 809 (1980).
On remand, the Conyers court held, as a matter of state evidence law, that the slight probative
value and the highly prejudicial effect of post-arrest, pre-warning silence precludes its use at trial
to impeach a defendant's testimony. People v. Conyers, 52 N.Y.2d 454, 457, 420 N.E.2d 933, 935-
36, 438 N.Y.S. 2d 741, 743-44 (1981). The court's reliance on an independent state ground ex-
empted the case from Supreme Court review. The rehearing of Hurd went unreported, and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari. Michigan v. Hurd, 102 Mich. App. 424, 301 N.W.2d 881, va-
cated and remanded, 454 U.S. 807 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982).
60. See Weir v. Fletcher, 658 F.2d 1126, 1131-32 (6th Cir. 1981) (review of post-Doyle cases),
rev'd, 455 U.S. 603 (1982); Brief for Respondent at 8, Fletcher v. Weir, 102 S. Ct. 1309 (1981)
(discussion of post-Doyle conflict among circuits).
In two cases decided after Jenkins, the record failed to disclose whether the defendant had
received Miranda warnings. United States v. Curtis, 644 F.2d 263, 270-72 (3d Cir. 1981); United
States v. Harrington, 636 F.2d 1182, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 1980). For discussion of Jenkins, see supra
notes 48-50 and accompanying text. In another case, also decided after Jenkins, the police issued
warnings but this fact did not affect the outcome. Al v. Olim, 639 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1980). The
remaining post-Doyle cases support the exclusion of post-arrest, pre-warning silence in dicta. See
United States v. Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d 1093, 1099-1101 (2d Cir. 1980) (use of post-arrest, pre-
warning silence to impeach held improper because silence ambiguous; right to remain silent exists
independently of Miranda warnings; police misconduct must be deterred); Bradford v. Stone, 594
F.2d 1294, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1979) (impeachment use of post-arrest silence impermissible regard-
less of whether Miranda warnings given); United States ex rel. Allen v. Rowe, 591 F.2d 391, 399
(7th Cir. 1979) (no reason to distinguish between silence before and after Miranda warnings);
Douglas v. Cupp, 578 F.2d 266, 267 (9th Cir. 1978) (use of post-arrest, pre-warning silence in
state's case-in-chief impermissible), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1081 (1979); United States v. Brinson,
411 F.2d 1057, 1060 (6th Cir. 1969) (pre-warning silence not usable as a "tacit admission" to prove
state's case-in-chief). Cf. Minor v. Black, 527 F.2d 1, 4 (6th Cir. 1975) (impeachment use of post-
arrest, pre-warning silence impermissible when silence based on advice of attorney), cert. denied,
427 U.S. 904 (1976).
In Minor and Douglas, the Supreme Court declined to review decisions prohibiting the use of
pre-warning silence. For a detailed discussion of Minor, see Steinberg, Minor v. Black: The Use
of Defendant's Pre-Trial Silence for Impeachment Purposes, 6 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 421 (1976);
Comment, Silence of Accused Relying Upon His Privilege 4gainst Self-Incrimination Was in This
Instance not a Prior Inconsistent Act-E;idence Error of Constitutional Magnitude: Minor v.
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Circuit interpreted Doyle expansively. The court held that allowing
cross-examination concerning post-arrest silence is "inherently unfair"
even if no Miranda warnings are issued.62 The court based its holding
on evidentiary,63 due process, 64 and policy grounds.65
Black, 3 N. Ky. L. REV. 267 (1975). But see Williams v. Zahradnick, 632 F.2d 353, 360 (4th Cir.
1980) (Doqle holding applies after warnings issued).
61. 658 F2d 1126 (6th Cu. 1981),rev'd, 455 U.S. 603 (1982).
62 Id. at 1127, 1130. For cases citing the Sixth Circuit's opinion, see People v. Lucas, 88 Il.
2d 245, 253, 430 N.E.2d 1091, 1095 (1981) (Clark, J., concurring) (comment on defendant's post-
arrest, pre-warning statement impermissible); Richter v. State, 642 P.2d 1269, 1274 (Wyo. 1982)
(Doile per se rule only applies if error not harmless).
In addition to holding that use of post-arrest, pre-warning silence is impermissible, the Sixth
Circuit decided that the use of silence in this case did not constitute "harmless error." This two-
step process adopted by the court is typical of cases dealing with Doyle-type error. Of the twenty-
six states considering the question, twenty-four apply a harmless error test to Doyle-type evidence
errors. See Wilkinson v. State, 361 So. 2d 400 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978); State v. Davis, 119 Ariz.
529, 582 P.2d 175 (1978); People v. Schindler, 114 Cal. App. 3d 178, 170 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1980);
People v. Ortega, 40 Colo. App. 449, 580 P.2d 813 (1978); State v. Zeko, 177 Conn. 545, 418 A.2d
917 (1979); Smith v. State, 244 Ga. 814, 262 S.E.2d 116 (1979); People v. Green, 74 Ill. 2d 444, 386
NE.2d 272 (1979); Jones v. State, 265 Ind. 447, 355 N.E.2d 402 (1976); State v. Satterfield, 3 Kan.
App. 2d 212, 592 P.2d 135 (1979); Darnell v. Commonwealth, 558 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. 1977); Robe-
son v. State, 285 Md. 498,403 A.2d 1221 (1979); Commonwealth v. Grieco, 5 Mass. App. 350, 362
N.E.2d 1204 (1977); People v. Sain, 407 Mich. 412, 285 N.W.2d 772 (1979); State v. Callahan, 310
N.W.2d 550 (Minn. 1981); Cooley v. State, 391 So. 2d 614 (Miss. 1980); State v. Walker, 617
S.W.2d 94 (Mo. App. 1981); State v. Callaway, 92 N.M. 80, 582 P.2d 1293 (1978); People v. Sav-
age, 67 A.D.2d 562, 415 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1979); State v. Carmody, 253 N.W.2d 415 (N.D. 1977);
Maxville v. State, 629 P.2d 1279 (Okl. Crim. App. 1981); Schrum v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 204,
246 S.E.2d 893 (1978); State v. Evans, 96 Wash. 2d 1, 633 P.2d 83 (1981); State v. Boyd, 233 S.E.2d
710 (W. Va.1977); Rudolph v. State, 78 Wis. 2d 435, 254 N.W.2d 471 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
944(1978).
Pennsylvania wavers in its application of the harmless error standard. See Commonwealth v.
Easley, 245 Pa. Super. 41,369 A.2d 283 (1976), rev'd, 483 Pa. 337, 396 A.2d 1198 (1979); Common-
wealth v. Flynn, 248 Pa. Super. 374 A.2d 1317 (1977).
All of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals that have confronted Doyle-type cases re-
quire prejudicial error. See United States ex rel Allen v. Franzen, 659 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1981);
Weir v. Fletcher, 658 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 455 U.S. 603 (1982); United States v. Ylda,
643 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1981); Williams v. Zahradnick, 634 F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1980); Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 922 (1980); Morgan v. Hall, 569 F.2d 1161 (Ist Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910
(1978); United States v. Williams. 556 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977).
For an explanation of the "harmless error" test, see Weir v. Fletcher, 658 F.2d 1126, 1132-33 (6th
Cir. 1981), rer'd 455 U.S. 603 (1982). See also Note, Miranda Warnings and the Harmless Error
Doctrine: Comment on the Indiana Approach, 47 IND. L.J. 331 (1972); Note, Application of the
Harmless Error Doctrine to Violations of Miranda: The California Experience, 69 MICH. L. REV.
941 (1971); Comment, Harmless Constitutional Error-Post-Arrest Silence of Accused Used by
Prosecutorfor Impeachment Purposes- Darnell v. Commonwealth, 5 N. Ky. L. REV. 287 (1978).
63. Weir v. Fletcher, 658 F.2d 1126, 1130-31 (6th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 455 U.S. 603 (1982). The
court stated that post-arrest silence may result from fear and anxiety created by arrest and in-
dependent knowledge of the right to remain silent. The court argued that these factors do not
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The Supreme Court in Fletcher v. Weir66 declined to read Doyle v.
Ohio6 7 as preventing prosecutorial use of post-arrest, pre-warning si-
lence to impeach a defendant's trial testimony.68 After reaffirming
Hale69 and Doyle,7 ° the Court held that absent Miranda warnings, the
state has not provided the arrestee with any assurance7 that his silence
will not be used against him.72 On that assumption, the prosecution's
use of post-arrest, pre-warning silence for impeachment purposes does
necessarily indicate the defendant's guilt or innocence. Id. For other factors capable of inducing
silence, see supra note 37.
The dissent argued that post-arrest, pre-warning silence may have some probative value, stating
that "[i]t is indeed difficult to discern why as a practical matter, the precise moment of arrest must
automatically make any silence lose all probity of the truth of a defendant's exculpatory story."
Id. at 1136 (Engel, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 1131. The court declined to apply the Jenkins dictum which declared Miranda
warnings essential to Doyle. Instead, the court applied Doyle liberally by declaring arrest alone
sufficient governmental action upon which to base a due process claim. The court said, "[w]e
think that an arrest, by itself, is governmental action which implicitly induces a defendant to
remain silent." Id
The dissent found nothing unfair about using the defendant's silence to impeach his alibi. It
reasoned that no governmental action gave the defendant cause to think that his silence was
unusable, and neither the arrest itself nor the cross-examination were fundamentally unfair. Id. at
1134-35 (Engel, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 1132. The Sixth Circuit offered two policy arguments to bolster its decision. First,
the court asserted that admitting post-arrest, pre-warning silence for impeachment purposes pe-
nalizes those defendants who are already aware of their right to remain silent. Id. The dissent
responded that the defendant could eliminate any unfairness at trial because he "may still explain
that his silence was premised on the exercise of the right." Id. at 1136 (Engel, J., dissenting).
Second, the court argued that allowing such impeachment would discourage police officers from
issuing Miranda warnings, at least until after sufficient time elapses to provide prosecutors with
material for impeachment use. Id. at 1132. The dissent argued that withholding warnings is
contrary to the interests of the police because any confession obtained prior to warning the de-
fendant is inadmissible to prove the state's case-in-chief. See supra note 30 and accompanying
text. Further, the prosecution can only use silence if the defendant chooses to testify. Id. at 1136
(Engel, J., dissenting). For further discussion of this second policy objection, see infra notes 80-82
and accompanying text.
66. 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam).
67. 426 U.S. 610 (1976). See supra notes 43-46.
68. Id. at 605-06.
69. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975). See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 604-05
(1982). See also supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
70. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 605 (1982). See
also supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
71. The Court quoted Doyle for the proposition that Miranda warnings provide the defend-
ant with an implicit assurance that his silence will not be used against him at trial. See supra note
44.
72. 455 U.S. 603, 606 (1982).
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not violate due process of law.7 3 The Court, therefore, made explicit
that the issuance of Miranda warnings is essential to invoke Doyle's
protection against impeachment with post-arrest silence.7 4
The Supreme Court's refusal in Fletcher v. Weir 75 to apply Doyle's
due process holding to cases involving pre-warning silence is theoreti-
cally sound. The Court correctly declined to hold that the act of arrest
alone constitutes an assurance by the state that it will not subsequently
use the arrestee's silence against him. As such, prosecutorial use of a
defendant's pre-warning silence for impeachment purposes is not fun-
damentally unfair.
Courts should not interpret the Fletcher decision as a blanket ap-
proval of prosecutorial use of post-arrest, pre-warning silence for im-
peachment purposes. While the use of such silence does not violate
due process, it may not satisfy evidentiary standards.7 6 Because the act
of arrest may infact induce silence,77 post-arrest silence will frequently
lack probative value.78 Such a showing would require the exclusion of
73. Id. at 607. In addition, the Court pointed out that "[a] State is entitled, in such situations,
to leave to the judge and jury under its own rules of evidence the resolution of the extent to which
post-arrest silence may be deemed to impeach a criminal defendant's own testimony." Id. This
suggests that the evidentiary approach of Hale is applicable to post-arrest, pre-warning silence.
See supra notes 36-42; infra notes 76-79.
74. Id. at 605-07. In reaching its holding the Supreme Court concluded that the Sixth Cir-
cuit's decision was inconsistent with post-Doyle Court decisions. Id. at 606. The Court argued
that its decisions in Jenkins, Anderson, and Roberts indicated that the assurances provided by
Miranda warnings were crucial to Doyle's due process holding. Id. (citing Jenkins v. Anderson,
447 U.S. 231 (1980); Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980); Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S.
552 (1980)). For discussion of these cases, see supra notes 48-54.
Commenting on its Jenkins holding, the Fletcher Court stated that, "[i]n Jenkins we noted that
the failure to speak involved in that case occurred before the defendant was taken into custody
and was given his Miranda warnings, commenting that no governmental action induced the de-
fendant to remain silent before his arrest." 455 U.S. 603, 606 (1982). With regard to its decision
in Roberts, the Court noted, "we observed that the post-conviction, presentencing silence of the
defendant did not resemble 'postarrest silence that may be induced by the assurances contained in
Miranda warnings."' Id. (quoting Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 561 (1980)). Finally,
the Court cited language from its opinion inAnderson: "Miranda warnings inform a person of his
right to remain silent and assure him, at least implicitly, that his silence would not be used against
him. . . . Doyle bars the use against a criminal defendant of silence maintained after the receipt
of governmental assurances." Id. (quoting Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 408, 404,407-08 (1980)).
75. 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam).
76. See supra note 73.
77. See supra notes 17 & 37 and accompanying text. The Fletcher Court emphasized the
state's assurance of protection rather than its inducement of silence. 445 U.S. 603, 604-07 (1982).
78. The prosecution must demonstrate the probative value of silence in each case. See supra
note 17 and accompanying text.
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pre-warning silence on evidentiary rather than constitutional
grounds.79
Moreover, the Fletcher decision will probably have an undesirable
effect in practice. Miranda requires the state to issue warnings to safe-
guard the accused's right against self-incrimination. 8° Fletcher, by de-
clining to protect defendants who have not received Miranda warnings,
encourages police to delay the administration of warnings to create si-
lence for later impeachment use.8' This result is contrary to the spirit
of Mfiranda and marks another retreat by the Supreme Court from the
protection offered by the exclusionary rule.82
The Court's refusal to extend Doyle's due process holding to pre-
Miranda-warning silence in the face of unanimous lower court deci-
sions83 urging the extension exemplifies the relative weight the current
Supreme Court gives to the often conflicting goals of protecting defend-
ants' procedural rights and promoting the institutional truth-seeking
79. Courts' approaches to the use of defendants' silence have developed hierarchically. See
supra text accompanying note 20-22. The due process holding of Doyle provides the highest de-
gree of protection to defendants. In declining to apply this standard to pre-warning silence, the
Court in Fletcher left the other historical rationales unaffected. In the absence of the due process
rationale, therefore, federal courts will now apply the next most protective standard to pre-warn-
ing silence, the rebuttable presumption of logical irrelevance espoused in Hale. See supra notes
36-42 and accompanying text. If this standard applies after Fletcher, a case-by-case evaluation of
probativeness and prejudice will replace Doyle's irrebuttable bar to the use of post-arrest, pre-
warning silence. Even though the Hale rule does not bind the states, state courts will probably
follow the lead of the federal courts as they did between Hale and Doyle. See supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
80. The Sixth Circuit majority made this argument. Weir v. Fletcher, 658 F.2d 1126, 1132
(6th Cir. 1981), rev'd 455 U.S. 603 (1982). See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 65 for a discussion of this danger by the Sixth Circuit in Weir v. Fletcher,
658 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 455 U.S. 603 (1982). The dissent based its response to this
argument on police concern for obtaining a confession. Id. at 1136 (Engel, J., dissenting). Given
the many ways in which arrest alone may induce silence, however, see notes 37 & 65, the likeli-
hood of a confession is not very great. When police sense that an arrestee will not confess, the
Fletcher decision removes all incentive to comply with the requirements of Miranda.
An analogous limitation of defendants' rights which has had deleterious effects is the restriction
of the right to counsel at police lineups to lineups occurring after the defendant is formally
charged or indicted. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967). The failure to extend the right to counsel in this area encourages police to delay
charging arrestees until after the police have held lineups. See Note, The Pretrial Right to Coun-
sel 26 STAN. L. REv. 399 (1974).
82. See supra note 31 for cases restricting the exclusionary rule in the area of defendant
testimony.
83. See supra note 60 for post-Doyle cases urging the extension of Doyle's protection to pre-
warning silence.
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concerns of the state.8 4 Fletcher v. Weir85 heightens the tension be-
tween these two goals.
K.D.G.
84. See supra note 39 for a discussion of the saliency of the Court's concern with the truth
seeking process.
85, 455 U.S. 603 (1982).
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